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ABSTRACT
The correct configuration of HTTPS is a complex set of tasks, which
many administrators have struggled with in the past. Let’s Encrypt
and Electronic Frontier Foundation’s Certbot aim to improve the
TLS ecosystem by offering free trusted certificates (Let’s Encrypt)
and by providing user-friendly support to configure and harden
TLS (Certbot). Although adoption rates have increased, to date,
there has been only a little scientific evidence of the actual usability
and security benefits of this semi-automated approach. Therefore,
we conducted a randomized control trial to evaluate the usability of
Let’s Encrypt and Certbot in comparison to the traditional certifi-
cate authority approach. We performed a within-subjects lab study
with 31 participants. The study sheds light on the security and
usability enhancements that Let’s Encrypt and Certbot provide. We
highlight how usability improvements aimed at administrators can
have a large impact on security and discuss takeaways for Certbot
and other security-related tasks that experts struggle with.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Transport Layer Security (TLS) is among the most important proto-
cols to secure data in transit, and has been an active research topic
in the usable security domain, especially regarding the end-user’s
perspective, e.g., [20,39,44]. For a decade, substantial effort has been
invested in improving the efficacy of TLS warnings. From one of
the earliest works by Sunshine et al. [44] to today, usable security
researchers have attempted to find ways to help end-users make
good decisions when faced with such warnings.
However, end-users are only one part of the picture. Akhawe et
al. conducted a large-scale measurement study [5] and estimated
that end-users would see 15,400 false positive warnings per true
positive warning due to server misconfigurations.
In 2015, Let’s Encrypt (LE) began operating, to increase TLS
adoption by offering free certificates. Let’s Encrypt is a non-profit
certificate authority (CA) that was founded “to reduce financial,
technological, and education barriers to secure communication over
the Internet” [3]. In conjunction with LE, the Electronic Frontier
Foundation (EFF) offers Certbot, a tool that automates the acquisi-
tion and configuration of LE certificates for web servers [18]. The
hope of this initiative is to reduce the barriers and improve the
usability of the TLS setup. The data published by LE suggests that
adoption rates are rising [32], and that it is mainly impacting the
lower-cost end of the web, as 98% of the LE certificates are issued
for domains outside the Alexa 1M [4].
Manousis et al. [34] found that only 50% of the domains that
obtained an LE certificate actually responded with a valid LE cer-
tificate on the standard HTTPS port. The authors concluded that
despite the many positive effects of LE, “there are serious miscon-
figurations among many website owners who use Let’s Encrypt”.
To shed light on where the adoption problems above stem from,
and to examine the advantages of LE, we conducted a randomized
control trial to compare the usability of the EFF’s Certbot
with the traditional certificate configuration approach. The
contributions of this paper are as follows:
(1) We present a quantitative study with 31 computer science
students that compares the usability of two different methods
for interacting with a certificate authority (CA) and config-
uring TLS on a web server.
(2) We show that Certbot’s usability improvements are particu-
larly important for lower-skilled participants.
(3) We analyze in which areas the automation of Certbot is
particularly important.
(4) We discuss what lessons can be learned from Certbot and
identify areas where these do not apply easily.
(5) We provide amethodological discussion of conducting lengthy
laboratory user studies with expert users, such as adminis-
trators, and share the lessons learned.
2 RELATEDWORK
When correctly deployed, TLS [12] protects the integrity and pri-
vacy of digital communication. However, different TLS features
and protocol versions have been shown to have vulnerabilities,
thus making several configurations (i.e., combinations of such fea-
tures) insecure [11]. BEAST and DROWN are examples of effective
and practicable attacks against TLS [8,26]. To understand the real-
world vulnerabilities of the TLS ecosystem and the diversity of TLS
(mis-)configurations, researchers examined TLS deployments in
measurement studies and user studies.
2.1 Measurement Studies
Internet-wide scanning tools, such as ZMap [16] and Censys [13],
are used to measure TLS in the wild. They were used in studies that
identified frequent configuration problems that potentially lead to
browser warnings and create attack surfaces [2,10,14].
Ouvrier et al. [38] passively monitored 232 million HTTPS ses-
sions and reported that more than 25% of the sessions had weak
security properties. Gustafsson et al. [23] analyzed differences in
public Certificate Transparency (CT) logs, while Holz et al. [25] eval-
uated the security of email and chat infrastructures, and reported
“a worryingly high number of poorly secured servers”. With the
recent evolution of smart environments, new TLS-secured device
classes have popped up. Samarasinghe and Mannan [41] measured
the TLS parameters of 299,858 devices (e.g., cameras), and the au-
thors found that such devices are usually more vulnerable than the
Alexa Top Million sites. Common security problems included the
use of RSA 512-bit keys, the RC4 stream cipher, or SSLv2 and SSLv3.
Finally, Van der Sloot et al. [45] compared different measurement
approaches and found that comparative analyses using aggregated
CT logs, Censys snapshots, and Alexa 1M scans provide accurate
snapshots of the TLS ecosystem.
Durumeric et al. [15] tracked the vulnerable population after the
disclosure of Heartbleed, and found that, even after two days, 11%
of the Alexa 1M sites remained vulnerable. Popular sites responded
more quickly, while 3% of the analyzed population remained vul-
nerable as long as two months after being notified.
Kranch and Bonneau [28] investigated the use of novel security
features such as HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) and public-
key pinning, and identified usability problems as the main reasons
for reluctant upgrade behavior. The authors reported that “even
conceptually simple security upgrades [are] challenging to deploy
in practice.” Amann et al. [7] claimed that only the Signaling Ci-
pher Suite Value (SCSV) and Certificate Transparency “have gained
enough momentum to improve the overall security of HTTPS.”.
2.2 User Studies
Most TLS-related user studies focus on end-users, and their re-
actions to warnings. Sunshine et al. [44] conducted the first lab
study examining the efficacy of current browsers’ TLS warnings
and evaluating two custom warning designs. Harbach et al.[24]
studied how aspects of a warning message influence user reactions
and found that linguistic properties have a strong impact. Several
other studies were performed in the lab [42], online [20], and in
the field [20,21] to analyze the impact of the warning design and
contextual factors [39] on users’ click-through rates, and found that
better warning designs can increase adherence rates [20].
Compared to the wealth of research focusing on end-users, there
is far less focused on administrators. Fahl et al. [19] surveyed
755 web developers and investigated the reasons for deploying
non-validating X.509 certificates on publicly available websites. Al-
though one third of the participants admitted to misconfiguring the
web servers accidentally, the majority stated that they knew about
the problem, and gave reasons for their configuration choices. For
example, some system administrators mentioned the high prices
of CAs as a reason for intentionally deploying non-validating cer-
tificates; others stated that they did not trust CAs or had trouble
configuring virtual hosts. Based on a mental model study by Kromb-
holz et al. [30], administrators lack of conceptual mental models of
HTTPS.
Schechter et al. [43] conducted user studies where the authors
compared the effect of role-playing in studies on the outcome. They
showed in a phishing study with end-users that participants in the
role-playing scenario behaved significantly less secure than those
who faced a more realistic one. Komanduri et al. [27] also compared
a survey to a scenario-based task description and found that users
tended to choose better passwords in the latter scenario.
Most relevant to our research is Krombholz et al.’s [31] user
study on the deployment process of HTTPS. The present study is an
extension of their study protocol. They conducted an observational
lab study with 28 knowledgeable users which simulated a simplified
certificate acquisition and standard deployment process. The study
used a minimal web-based CA where participants could acquire
TLS certificates to be manually installed on an Apache web server.
The study revealed a host of usability issues that often resulted in
vulnerable configurations. The study did not contain conditions
in which participants used LE and Certbot. The study also did not
inform participants about which security requirements they should
meet. The present study differs in several ways. First, we conducted
a randomized control trial to compare a traditional CA approach
to Let’s Encrypt and Certbot. We also explicitly told participants
which security goals should be reached, and how the security of the
resulting configuration could be evaluated. We made this change
because Naiakshina et al. found that computer science students did
not add security unless explicitly asked to [36]. The final important
difference in the study design is that we formalized the interaction
between the experimenter and the participants. In the Krombholz et
al. study, technical assistance was given; however, this was done in
situ, and was not planned in advance. In addition, the help was not
recorded, and it was not analyzed. We created a Mattermost support
channel for in-study realism, as well as to deliver consistent and
recorded interaction with the participants. Our records on when
participants required which kind of help offer valuable insights into
the usability challenges. A final important difference concerns the
participant sample. Krombholz et al. invited the 30 best students of
the pre-screening survey of whom 28 participated in the study. We
did not filter out lower-skilled participants because we wanted to
see the effects of Certbot on different skill levels.
In parallel research, Bernhard et al.’s work [9] analyzed the us-
ability of Let’s Encrypt in comparison to a traditional CA approach.
They conducted two studies: one within subjects with nine par-
ticipants and one between subjects with ten participants (five per
condition). In the first study, none of the nine participants managed
to complete the traditional CA task, and only four managed to
complete it with Let’s Encrypt. In the second study, the authors got
conflicting information with three of five managed to complete it
in each condition. The authors stated that this was likely due to a
change in recruitment criteria which was introduced in the second
study to raise the skill level of the participants. Due to this, and
the small sample sizes, the authors stated that they had found no
reliable effects, and even conflicting information on which system
offers better usability. In conclusion, they wrote: “ However, we did
not find conclusive evidence regarding which method [Let’s Encrypt
vs. Traditional CA] is more satisfactory to users, which enables more
secure configurations, which system users were more confident in, nor
which systems users would recommend. This is likely due to our small
sample size, and future work is needed to better understand these
features.” The present study has a larger sample size, so it does not
suffer from these issues. The study also gathered additional details
via logging and the Mattermost support channel, so the analysis
can go into more detail about where participants faced challenges
and how Certbot helped them.
3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The research questions are split into two groups. The first relate to
the main subject matter, the usability of Certbot.
Does Certbot support its users in fulfilling the task of en-
abling TLS?
Related work has shown that users struggle with manually deploy-
ing SSL certificates. We want to measure Certbot’s performance
and capability to help administrators set up TLS correctly com-
pared to the manual approach, to quantify the performance, as
well as to draw lessons learned from the Certbot approach.
How do participants perceive Certbot’s functionality and
usability?
Although automated configuration has many usability benefits,
it is an open question whether administrators feel comfortable
with the decreased level of control they might perceive due to
automation.
How can the Certbot process be improved?
Although Certbot has a reputation for good usability, we are inter-
ested in possible areas of improvement, to support evenmore users
in deploying secure TLS correctly. Because the usability is likely
to be good from the start, we do not expect major improvements,
but are open to the possibility.
The second group of questions relates to study methodology for
administrator studies. Usable security researchers have a decade of
experience in end-user studies. Studies with developers and admin-
istrators do not have the same body of knowledge yet. Naiakshina
et al. found that the way tasks are framed for computer science
students and freelance developers has a significant effect on how
participants deal with security [35–37]. To add to this body of
knowledge, we introduce the following research question:
How does task framing affect how participants behave in
the study?
A common method used to elicit realistic behavior in end-user
studies is to use a role-playing scenario [27,43]. We are interested
in seeing whether this tool is also useful for studies with experts
like administrators or developers who are represented in this study
through student proxies [36].
4 METHODOLOGY
4.1 Study Design
Similar to Krombholz et al. [31], we opted for a lab study to monitor
and control the participants’ behavior. In contrast to Krombholz et
al.’s study, we looked at two independent variables. We conducted
an A/B test to compare the usability of Certbot with a traditional CA.
Thus, we had two treatment conditions: “CA-Certbot” (CA-Cbot)
for the Certbot with Let’s Encrypt condition and “CA-Traditional”
(CA-Trad.) for the traditional manual CA approach. Although it
would have been nice if we could have used the same web CA as
used by Krombholz et al. to enable a more direct comparison with
their work, we opted to use a more complex one that resembles the
realistic workflow of acquiring a certificate from an existing CA.
In particular, the method included ownership verification. There, a
server owner has to prove that they are in possession of the server
and domain by placing a specific file in the web folder or by re-
sponding with defined content to a request made by the CA. We
opted for these improvements because they would give a fairer
comparison for the CA-Certbot condition which has the full com-
plexity of the real-world implementation. Because we assume that
the configuration task is highly dependent on personal skills, we
opted to study the two conditions within subjects, because the sam-
ple size which would have been needed to balance out personal
skill in a between-subject design would have been unattainably
huge. To counter learning and fatigue effects, we randomized the
order of conditions: Half the participants were assigned to use
CA-Traditional first, and the other half started with CA-Certbot
first.
The second variable is a meta-variable concerning the task fram-
ing. In a developer study conducted with students, Naiakshina et
al. reported that in post-task interviews, some participants excused
poor or no security performance by stating that they would have
tried harder if they had been working for a real company as op-
posed to participating in a study [36]. This is a general problem for
security-focused user studies in which participants know they are
taking part in a study. There is always the risk that participants
behave less securely because they know they are safe in a study
environment or that they behave more securely because they want
to impress the experimenters. A possible approach to mitigate this
problem in end-user studies is to construct a role-playing scenario,
and make the task as realistic as possible, to get participants into
the “right” frame of mind. However, because we do not have the
body of experience with expert studies that we do with end-users,
it is not clear whether this kind of role-playing is necessary or
beneficial. Therefore, we opted to introduce a variable to study
the effect due to framing as well. For half of the participants, the
task was framed as a study task (Framing Study); i.e., study-related
user names (e.g., HXR) and passwords (e.g., HXR12345) were used.
For the other half of the participants, we created a role-playing
scenario (Framing Role-Play) in which they were asked to imagine
they were working for a company. Thus URLs, user names, and
passwords were tailored to be realistic. Naturally, such a framing
variable cannot be studied within subjects, but has to be studied
between subjects.
The four conditions we used in the mixed within-/between-study
design can be seen in Table 1. The effects of the different configu-
ration conditions CA-Certbot and CA-Traditional were evaluated
within subjects while “framing” effects were evaluated between
subjects.
Between: Framing
Role-Play Study
Within: CA-Cbot 1: CA-Cbot+RP 2: CA-Cbot+Study
CA CA-Trad. 3: CA-Trad.+RP 4: CA-Trad.+Study
Table 1: The four conditions we used in the study.
After completing each configuration task, the participants filled
out an online survey that asked them about several aspects of the
tasks they had performed, e.g., their self-assessment of their perfor-
mance and their perception of the difficulty. After completing both
tasks and the questionnaires, a final questionnaire was presented
which directly compared the CA-Certbot and CA-Traditional tasks.
The questionnaires can be found in appendices A and B.
4.2 Task Design
To tie the findings to related work, and to allow for a better compar-
ison, the task design was based on the study by Krombholz et al.,
with some modifications as described in this section. The main task
of the lab study was to acquire a certificate for a remote Apache
web server and configure HTTPS with clear security expectations.
Figure 1 shows the workflow scheme of the TLS configuration pro-
cess from Krombholz et al.’s study that includes nearly all steps
that are technically necessary in the manual approach, and that is
similar to the CA-Traditional condition. To illustrate the Certbot
automation approach, we enclosed the steps that Certbot automates
with a grey box in Figure 1.
4.2.1 Sub-task 1: Baseline (SSH and Apache admin). Sub-task 1
consisted of logging on to the study server using SSH and executing
some basic copy commands to place some web pages in the www
directory of Apache. Sub-task 1 was used as a non-security baseline
to see if participants had basic Linux skills. If participants failed in
this task, their performance on the other tasks had to be taken in
the context of their low Linux skill level. These two steps will be
referred to as SSH and Apache.
Figure 1: The workflow scheme of Let’s Encrypt based on
Krombholz et al.[31]
4.2.2 Sub-task 2: Certificate Acquisition (CA). This sub-task in-
cluded the steps “Create keypair & CSR1” and “Interact with CA”
of Figure 1. We had the A/B test between CA-Certbot and CA-
Traditional. In the CA-Certbot condition, participants were told
to use Let’s Encrypt to acquire and install a certificate. In the CA-
Traditional condition, participants used a traditional CA to acquire
a certificate. Krombholz et al. used a custom minimalistic CA which
did not resemble the user experience of a real CA. To make the
traditional CA condition (CA-T condition) more realistic, we pro-
vided a forked version of gethttpsforfree2. This website resembles
the steps a website administrator has to take for several official
CAs, such as Comodo3 and provides a guideline.
4.2.3 Sub-task 3: Configuration (Conf). In this sub-task, we had
the A/B test between CA-Certbot and CA-Traditional, insofar as
in the CA-Certbot condition acquisition and installation could be
combined, and in the CA-Traditional condition, the participant had
to manually install the certificate acquired in sub-task 2. This task
resembled the “Integrate cert in Apache” phase in Figure 1.
4.2.4 Sub-task 4: Configuration tests. The study by Krombholz et al.
ended after sub-task 3 and evaluated what participants submitted,
based on criteria not known to the participants in advance. As
stated, Naiakshina et al. found that students did not implement
any security in a study setup unless specified to do so. Therefore,
we specified the security requirements in the task description and
added an explicit sub-task in which participants were asked to
check their configuration using the “Qualys SSL Server Test” tool4
Krombholz et al. used to evaluate the results for those participants.
The details are presented in Appendix E.
4.2.5 Timeframe. Due to the within-subjects design, each par-
ticipant completed the configuration task twice, once with each
approach. To avoid the study seeming tedious and fatiguing, we
1Certificate signing request
2https://gethttpsforfree.com, Accessed: 02/06/2019
3https://secure.instantssl.com/products/SSLIdASignup1a, Accessed: 02/06/2019
4https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/ Accessed: 09/02/2019
wanted to keep it as short as possible, while at the same time al-
lowing enough time that participants could realistically complete
the tasks. To determine the time needed, we conducted several
pre-studies, and settled on a maximum editing time of three hours
for the CA-Traditional task and a maximum of two hours for the
CA-Certbot task. After the time limit was exceeded, the participant
was asked to continue with the next condition. The observations
from the pre-study suggested that if participants had not solved the
tasks within these time limits, they would not be able to complete
the task within the study context. Thus, we counted the partici-
pants as failing that task without making excessive demands on
their time.5
4.3 Participants
One particular challenge for conducting studies with experts is
acquiring a satisfactory number of participants. Therefore, we con-
ducted the studywith computer science students, because recruiting
enough professional administrators for a five-hour lab study was
not feasible at this stage. There is also a growing body of evidence
that computer science students can serve as proxies for administra-
tors and developers in user studies [31,48]. In particular, Naiakshina
et al. found that students are viable proxies in a password storage
study in which the authors compared students to freelance develop-
ers[35]. Thus, although computer science students are not exactly
the same type of user as professional administrators, we believe
that they are acceptable proxies for the A/B study we conducted.
4.4 Recruitment and Demographics
For the first pre-study, we recruited three participants known to our
group who had experience in usability studies. These participants
gave feedback on the early study design.
We then recruited participants using a survey distributed via the
computer science mailing list of our university. The survey was
based on Krombholz et al.’s work [31] (see Appendix C). Sixty-eight
participants filled out the questionnaire. Ten participants who did
not fill out the questionnaire completely were removed from the
selection process.We invited all 58 remaining students to participate
in the lab study. Forty-five participants responded to the invitation,
and 38 actually took part. Krombholz et al. found that previous
experience in configuring web servers is a predictor of success. To
avoid this becoming a confound, in particular because we did not
exclude students with less experience, we ranked the participants
based on two criteria: 1) whether they had previously configured a
web server and 2) the number of correct answers in a pre-screening
questionnaire. This ranking was used to build pairs of students with
similar experience who were then randomly assigned to one of the
two framing conditions, “Framing Study” and “Framing Role-Play”.
Assignment to the CA conditions was alternated.
We conducted a second pre-study with four participants (one
in each condition) to further test and improve the experimental
design. This left us with 34 participants who completed the main
study.
5In retrospect, it would have been better to give CA-Certbot the time as CA-Traditional
even though it was not necessary for CA-Certbot itself. We discuss this point in the
limitations sections (6).
Three participants were removed from the data set: One partici-
pant completed the first task (CA-Traditional) twice instead of each
task once, and one participant successfully completed the first task
(CA-Certbot) but left the study without attempting to complete
the CA-Traditional task. Another participant encountered technical
problems due to a temporary bug in the Certbot repository. Table 2
shows the demographics of the remaining 31 participants.
All participants were compensated with 80 Euros. We received
IRB approval for the study. All participants consented to the study
and signed a written consent form.
Demographic Number Percent
Gender
Female 3 10%
Male 28 90%
Age
Min. 18
Max. 34
Median 25
Experience as sysadmin
Yes 22 71%
No 7 22%
No answer 2 7%
Configured TLS before
Yes 15 48%
No 16 52%
Currently employed as an administrator
Company web server 3
Private web server 1
Non-profit organization web server 9
Table 2: Participants’ demographics (N = 31)
4.5 Support Channel
The main goal of the study was to compare the usability of the CA
conditions (CA-Traditional and CA-Certbot), and identify common
pitfalls and potential areas of improvement. Several issues com-
plicated this goal. First, it was important to distinguish between
usability problems of the CA system and the general technical dif-
ficulties that participants might encounter. Related user studies
with complex tasks showed that there is the risk of a participant
failing early on, and thus, never getting to the tasks of interest [47].
Second, in relatively long procedures, such as in this study, simply
asking participants to report problems at the end of the experiment
runs the risk of participants forgetting some of the problems they
had. It is especially likely that big problems mask smaller problems
when participants recall the problems after the task.
To counter this issue, we introduced an in-scenario support
channel, similar to the study pilot used by Garfinkel et al. to interact
with participants [22]. We used the Mattermost chat client6, an
open source web chat platform, and a playbook (see Appendix D)
to implement the support channel. Mattermost was pre-installed
on all machines, and participants were told that they could message
two contacts listed under “direct messages” named support and
6https://about.mattermost.com/ Accessed: 02/06/2019
supervisor if they encountered any problems that they could not
solve on their own.
This support channel offered several benefits. First, if participants
had non-CA-related difficulties, e.g., while using SSH to connect to
the server, or setting permissions for copy operations, we were able
to provide assistance, so that the participants were able to proceed
with their main task. The fact that assistance was requested was
noted, and was included in the evaluation. Second, we received
feedback at the moment when problems occurred. Similar infor-
mation could have been acquired using the think-aloud method,
but we opted for the in-scenario channel to avoid the well-known
awkwardness of the think-aloud protocol. In addition, there have
been reports that think-aloud does not work well in long developer
studies [36].
To ensure that the support channel would not be used incon-
sistently, the experimenter had to strictly adhere to the following
procedure.
(1) If the question could be answered by referring the participant
to the task description, this was done.
(2) If the question was a general technical question, and equally
applicable to both CA conditions, help was given, and a note
was made.
(3) If the question was directly related to a CA aspect of the
task, the experimenter remotely analyzed what participants
had done up to that point and then made the following judg-
ment call: If the experimenter had the impression that the
participant had not tried hard enough or was close to finding
a solution without further help, the experimenter would re-
spond to the participant about 10 minutes after their message
to help. In addition to the couple of minutes needed to check
the participant’s actions, this delay was designed to raise the
threshold for participants to use the support channel.7
If this kind of support was given, the following levels were
used:
(a) If possible, only a nudge was given. This nudge would not
solve the problem but point the participant in the right
direction to solve the problem without further help.
(b) If that was unfeasible, a hint was given that would solve
the specific problem; e.g., the experimenter pasted the
required command in the chat, similar to how normal
support staff operate.
(c) And if that was unfeasible, the experimenter completed a
sub-task for the participant, e.g., sending the CSR, sending
the signed certificate, or installing the Certbot.
The last two options were last resorts. These sub-tasks were
then marked as failures for the participants because they received
CA-specific support. All other encounters fell into the category
non-CA-specific support. Both categories are defined in more detail
in section 5.4.
7This option turned out to not be needed, and we never had to wait 10 minutes. There
was one support request which the participant solved without help even before we
could have answered. In all other cases, there was ample evidence that participants
had tried to solve the problem on their own first.
4.6 Technical Setup
The study was conducted in our usability lab which can hold
up to eight participants at the same time. Each participant had
a workspace with a computer running an installation of the study
OS based on Ubuntu. Each participant had a set of over-ear noise
canceling headphones. We also provided an overview sheet with
credentials for Mattermost and Ubuntu, and a text describing the
structure of the study. An example can be seen in AppendixE. The
Ubuntu desktop was empty except for a link to the Mattermost chat
client. The web server to be configured was running on an Amazon
AWS server reachable via the domain given in the task description.
Apache2 was already installed with the default configuration.
No special restrictions were introduced for the handling of the
computer or the external server running the web server. The par-
ticipants were equipped with root access on the server. After the
task was completed, the image of the computer was automatically
saved, along with the browser history, the bash history, and the
Apache configuration files. Screen capture software recorded the
entire procedure for the task.
4.7 Ethics
All participants signed a consent formwith a description of the tasks
and information about data collection. They were informed about
the screen-recording software and the collection of their browser
and bash histories. Participants were also told that we would not
rate any of their solutions, and that we were interested only in the
process of how they executed their tasks, to prevent an exam-like
situation, which could make them feel uncomfortable or under
pressure, and introduce some kind of desirability bias. The consent
form, as well as the study, was approved by our university’s IRB.
All collected data was processed and stored in compliance with the
strict general data protection regulation (GDPR) of the European
Union.
5 RESULTS
In this section, we present the results from the lab study. We con-
ducted qualitative and quantitative analyses. Qualitative data was
collected from analyzing the discussions of the communication
channel, as well as free text answers in the survey data (answered
after each condition). Quantitative data was gathered from the anal-
ysis of the screen recordings of each participant in combination
with the collected bash log files and the Apache2 configuration
files. Unless stated otherwise, analyses were performed on the 31
participants who were exposed to both CA conditions. We found no
significant differences concerning the framing variable. Therefore,
the following analysis focuses on the CA variable.
5.1 Task Completion
In the following, we present the study participants’ success rates, as
well as the reasons for failure, as can be seen in Table 3. Please note
that it is possible for a participant to fail at a single task and still con-
tinue on, so each column represents the local view of that step. All
31 (100%) participants succeeded in the SSH task in both conditions.
Twenty-eight (90%) successfully deployed the website documents
in the CA-Certbot task and 29 (94%) in the CA-Traditional task.
CA-Certbot CA-Traditional
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Help+Hint 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 1
Failed at 0 3 1 0 0 2 2 9
Not started 0 0 2 3 0 0 2 5
Success 31 28 28 28 31 29 23 16
Table 3: Success rates of the participants (n = 31) divided by
the CA used and the sub-tasks: 1a) SSH connection to the
web server, 1b) Configuring Apache, 2) Acquiring a certificate
from the CA and 3) Configuring the web server to serve the
certificate. “Help+Hint” denotes the number of participants
who needed CA-specific support in the corresponding task,
“Failed at” the number of participants who failed at the step.
The participants who needed help to complete a task were
counted as fails but could continue on to the next task. Some
chose to give up, and are listed as “Not started”.
These were the two tasks we used to judge basic Linux/server con-
figuration skills. Twenty-eight (90%) participants in CA-Certbot
and 23 (74%) participants in CA-Traditional successfully interacted
with the CA and acquired a valid certificate. Twenty-eight (90%)
participants managed to correctly deploy the certificate with Let’s
Encrypt, 16 (52%) using the traditional approach.
All 28 participants in the CA-Certbot and 29 participants in
the CA-Traditional condition who got to the CSR stage succeeded
in creating a CSR. At that point different problems occured. To
dive deeper into the results, Table 4 provides an overview of the
certificate-related steps and problems (occurrences denoted by num-
bers in braces).We divided the table into four sub-groups:
• Certbot: In this step, the user has to install Certbot using the
operating system-dependent repository and start it.
• CSR: Then, the user has to create a key pair that is used to
create a CSR. In this step, they have to choose the key size
and the hash algorithm. They also have to decide for which
domains the certificate should be valid and create the actual
CSR.
• Prove ownership: In this step, the user must prove that they
are in control of the domain for which the certificate will be
issued. To do that, she must host a specific file on the server
the domain is pointing to. After the successful ownership
verification, the certificate is generated and provided.
• Certificate Installation: Now, the user has to integrate the
certificate in the Apache2 web server, enable SSL, create
a config file, and enable the site. As an option, they can
continue with a hardening phase.
For each of the steps, we highlighted in what areas knowledge or
skill is useful for that step. We differentiate between three areas: 1)
Apache. For these steps, skills in configuring Apache are needed. 2)
Operational. Knowledge about the operating system and how the
system is to be used in the end is needed. In this case specifically,
it is knowing which domains are to be used. 3) Security. In these
steps, users are exposed to security concepts and have to interact
with security tools. Black circles indicate areas where a lack of
knowledge or skill could lead to failing the step.
A surprising finding in our view is that the security or CA aspects
did not seem to cause the participants trouble. Instead, the steps in
which participants needed knowledge or skill to configure Apache
were difficult.
Three participants struggled with the ownership verification,
where they needed to configure the server to host a specific file
at a defined URL. They could not manage to configure this so that
the CA could verify ownership. Two participants had problems
deploying the certificate on the web server due to the UNIX file and
permission system that, e.g., prevented them from copying files.
These problems seem to be problems with the handling of UNIX,
Apache2, and bash, and are not directly security tasks. However,
they are necessary for the configuration.
Another participant did not know that the SSLmodule of Apache2
has to be enabled to serve websites over HTTPS. One problem oc-
curred because the participant created a new configuration file for
a website but did not know that this site had to be enabled with a
console command as well. Last, four participants could not manage
to start Apache2 after the edit of the configuration file. In every
on of these scenarios, we observed that the participants did trou-
bleshooting, e.g., by searching the web or looking at video tutorials,
but based on their statements, we conclude that they did not fully
understand the process and the corresponding environment.
One casewas particularly noteworthy: Participant P5who started
with the CA-Certbot condition failed the Apache task, i.e., did not
manage to correctly configure Apache to host the HTML files, but
managed to correctly operate Certbot and completed the security
configuration without task-related support. In the following CA-
Traditional task, P5 managed to configure Apache but then failed
to properly install the certificate. This lends further support to our
finding that it is not lack of security skills or knowledge causing
difficulties: The common source of difficulty is the Apache environ-
ment.
In total, 28 participants successfully managed to execute the
main task in the CA-Certbot condition, whereas 16 did so in the
CA-Traditional condition. McNemar’s chi-square test (p = 0.0015,
95% confidence interval from 1.527 to 28.563) indicates a statistically
significant higher completion rate in CA-Certbot (90%) than in CA-
Traditional (52%). The McNemar test was used because we were
operating on paired data.
As stated before, half of the participants interacted with Certbot
first, and the other half started with the traditional CA. In both
cases, we saw that the success rates were slightly higher for the
second condition, which could indicate a learning effect. Overall,
the CA-Certbot treatment had four failures when it came first, and
no failure when the task was completed as the second task. The
CA-Traditional treatment had eight failures when it came first, and
seven when it came second. However, the differences were not
statistically significant (Fisher’s exact test p = 0.226 and p = 0.724,
respectively).
Table 5 gives a more detailed within-subjects view and shows the
distribution of the outcome according to the number of web servers
Step Area Info CA-Certbot Failed CA-Traditional Failed
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Certbot
Install # # M - not necessary -
Run # # M 1 not necessary -
CSR
Create key pair (public+private key) ## key size & algorithm A - M -
Define domains # # M - M -
Create CSR with domains ## key size & algorithm A - M -
Prove ownership
Serve file at specific location on web server  ## A - M 3
Certificate Installation
Deploy certificate  # file permissions A - M 2
Enable Apache2 SSL module  ## A - M 1
Create SSL configuration file  # ciphers & protocols A - M 4
Enable site  ## A - M 1
Table 4: A detailed view of the steps and challenges of the CA and Configuration task. Beneath each step, the corresponding
type of knowledge is mentioned that is needed to execute it. An “M” in the right columns indicates that this step has to be
performed manually; “A” means that this step is automated.
Number
of web
servers
Fail both Success
CA-Certbot
only
Success
CA-Trad.
only
Success
with
both
0 2 3 0 1
1–5 1 8 0 9
≥ 6 0 1 0 6
Sum 3 12 0 16
Table 5: Success rate depending on the number of web
servers the participants had configured previously.
participants reported to have configured previously8. As shown, no
participant who managed to successfully use CA-Traditional failed
at using CA-Certbot (Success in CA-T only). However, 12 partici-
pants who succeededwith CA-Certbot failed in CA-Traditional (Suc-
cess in CA-C only). Four of them started with the CA-Certbottask
and eight with the CA-Traditionaltask. The results suggest that
the higher the number of servers a participant had configured pre-
viously, the fewer double failures occurred (no success in either
condition). In the one to five servers bin, roughly half the partici-
pants (eight of 18) managed only CA-Certbot, and half managed
both (nine of 18). In the six or more servers bin, almost all (six of
seven) managed both. This shows that Certbot (i.e., the CA-Certbot
condition) is particularly useful for less experienced administrators.
However, there was one exception in which the CA-Traditional
condition did better than the CA-Certbot task. It concerned the
valid domain names a certificate includes. Although not a technical
specification, it is a common convention that “tld.com” points to
8The questionnaire provided the answer bins 0, 1, 2–5, 6–15 and 16+. The bins 1 and
16+ had very few respondents; thus, we combined the bins with the adjacent bins for
ease of analysis.
CA-Certbot CA-Traditional
TLD only 8 1
WWW only 5 3
Both 15 13
Table 6: Distribution of the domains the participants chose
to include in the certificate separated by the CA condition.
“TLD only” and “WWW only” mean that they entered only
“tld.com” or “www.tld.com” as a valid domain.
the same website as “www.tld.com”. A problem that can arise is that
a certificate which is issued for only one of these domains triggers
a warning for the other domain. Table 6 shows the domains that
the participants chose for their certificate. In the CA-Traditional
condition, 13 participants configured their certificates to work for
both options. Only four picked only one or the other. In the CA-
Certbot condition, 15 configured their certificates to be valid for
both options, but 13 picked only one or the other. However, this
difference was not statistically significant (McNemar test p = 1.00).
5.2 Efficiency
For the 16 participants who succeeded at both tasks, we observed
the amount of time these participants needed to enable TLS on their
server. The time was derived from the video analysis in combination
with timestamps collected from the bash histories. We consider the
time span as the interval from certificate acquisition to the end of
the TLS deployment process. For the CA-Certbot task, we observed
a minimum time of six minutes. The maximum was 52 minutes,
with a median of 18 minutes (Mean = 21, SD = 15). For the CA-
Traditional task, the participants needed at least 23 minutes, and
up to 113 minutes with a median of 65 (Mean = 57, SD = 27). A
comparison of the two groups, the time participants needed for the
CA-Certbot task (Median = 18) was statistically significantly less
than for the CA-Traditional task (Median = 65; Wilcoxon signed
rank test, V = 2, p < .0027).
5.3 Security Analysis
CA-Cbot CA-Trad.
Grade
A+ 2 2
A 11 11
A- 0 3
B-F 0 0
T 3 0
Key Size
2048 15 0
4096 0 16
EC256 1 0
Forward Secrecy
Fully 16 13
Incomplete 0 1
Not Available 0 2
HSTS Yes 3 3No 13 13
Table 7: The security results we observed for each CA for
participants who finished both tasks (n = 16).
After the study was finished, we analyzed all final server con-
figurations using the “Qualys SSL Server Test” to identify the TLS-
configuration properties, and thus, the resulting security. Qualys
presents its user a rating for the server depending on the quality
of their SSL configuration. Table 7 shows the outcome for the 16
participants who finished both tasks divided into the CA-Certbot
group and the CA-Traditional group. Regarding the grade, nearly all
configurations got at least an A, meaning no known attacks on the
protocol were exploitable, and the key size was large enough. In the
CA-Certbot group, we observed three domain-name mismatches:
The domain from the certificate delivered by the server did not
match the domain name from the server because the participants
forgot to include “www” as a prefix for the domain name. This
resulted in a capped grade T (not Trusted), which otherwise would
have been an A-rated configuration. The reason that CA-Certbot
did worse than CA-Traditional in these cases can be traced to the
documentation used. In the three failure cases, the CA-Certbot par-
ticipants simply followed the instruction of the tool, which does not
mention or offer the www sub-domain. Whereas the tutorials used
by the CA-Traditional participants made them aware of the www
sub-domain, because it was suggested in an example together with
the plain domain. The participants with an A+ grade extended the
automatic configuration (CA-Certbot) or the manual configuration
(CA-Traditional) with additional features, such as enabling HSTS.
Due to the instructions given on the CA-Traditional homepage, all
participants generated a key with a key size of 4096 bits compared
to the 2048-bit keys generated by Certbot that were used 15 times.
One participant, however, followed instructions on some website
that generated the key using elliptic curves and a key size of 256
bits. Forward Secrecy was fully enabled by all 16 participants in the
CA-Certbot group and 13 in the CA-Traditional group. Only one
participant enabled Forward Secrecy incompletely, and two did not
manage to enable it. In both conditions, three participants enabled
HSTS, while all others did not.
Comparing the results to those of Krombholz et al. [31], the
participants achieved higher grades. Although most of the partici-
pants’ configurations resulted in the grade B (16 of 28), and only
four got an A, the participants in the present study who finished
CA-Traditional (n = 16) were graded with at least an A- (see Table
7). However, the CA we used provided examples which the minimal
CA of Krombholz et al. did not. However, only four participants had
an invalid configuration in Krombholz et al.’s study, compared with
15 in the present study. This result can be explained by two factors,
firstly the study set-up contained the entire process, and thus, was
more complex than the Krombholz et al’s study. Second, unlike
Krombholz et al., we did not filter based on skill, and therefore, had
a wider range of skill sets in the participant sample.
Comparing the results to Bernhard et al. [9], the participants
had more success. In Bernhard et al.’s first study zero out of nine
participants managed to use the traditional CA, and only four out
of nine managed with Let’s Encrypt. In their second study, three
out of five managed with the traditional CA, and the same number
managed with Let’s Encrypt. As no details were reported at which
steps the participants failed, and skill was not measured with a
questionnaire but self-reported, a more detailed comparison is not
possible.
5.4 Support
To observe the usage of the Mattermost support and feedback chan-
nel, we recorded the time and the reason for which a participant
contacted us. Twenty-five participants used the channel and asked
52 questions. Because the categorization of these messages was crit-
ical for all other results, we followed a two-stage coding procedure:
First, three coders independently coded all support interactions
using the categories. We calculated an initial Fleiss’ kappa (0.5)
and Krippendorff’s alpha (0.5) [29]. With three coders and eight
categories, values in this range are to be expected. All codes with
disagreement were discussed, and full agreement was reached in
the second round of coding. For coding categories, see Table 8.
To simplify the analysis with respect to success, we grouped
participants in categories from 0 to 4 as participants who received
only non-CA-specific support. They did not receive any information
relevant to the success or failure of the CA conditions that they did
not already have in the task description. Category 5 participants
were labeled as having received “technical help” while also being
counted as receiving non-CA-specific support. The distinguishing
factor for technical help was that the problem had to be the same for
both CA conditions, e.g., SSH or permission problems. As a counter-
example, we had two participants who had problems installing
Python. This was not categorized as a general technical problem,
because installing Python was needed only for the CA-Certbot
condition and not in the CA-Traditional condition, and thus, critical
to the CA aspect. Categories 6–8 were given if questions were
specific to one of the two CA conditions. Thus, participants who
needed this kind of help fell into the CA-specific support category.
Only one participant received only a single nudge; thus, category
6 did not carry much relevance for further analysis. As stated in
Category Name Description
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0 No Support Contact
1 Self-Help Participant solved the problem before the support experimenter had to intervene.
2 Study Description Questions related to information that had been handed out in the study description.
The support experimenter simply repeated information from the task description.
3 A* Questions that went above and beyond what was expected of participants; e.g., partici-
pant asked whether we would prefer ECC over the default RSA. The support experi-
menter would give the answer closest to the default option.
4 Off-Topic Messages that had no relation to the task or useful information, e.g., “What is my study
ID?”
5 General Technical Problems with standard Unix commands, which affect both CA conditions equally, e.g.,
problems with SSHing onto the study server.
CA
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6 Nudge Conversations where the support experimenter nudged the participants to think for
themselves, e.g., answering a question by saying, “This is up to you.”
7 Hint The support experimenter sent a concrete hint for how to solve a CA-related problem,
for instance, a command to run the Certbot.
8 Active Help The support experimenter executed part of the task for the participant, e.g., generating
the signed certificate because the participant was not likely to succeed within the time
allotted, and we wanted to gather information on how the next steps would play out.
Table 8: Support Categories
Name CA-Certbot CA-Traditional Total
Questions Participants Success rate Questions Participants Success rate Questions
General Technical 6 4 50% 23 10 37% 29
Study Description 3 3 100% 7 7 71% 10
Active Help 1 1 0% 5 4 0% 6
Hint 0 0 -% 4 2 0% 4
A* 0 0 -% 1 1 100% 1
Nudge 0 0 -% 1 1 0% 1
Self-Help 0 0 -% 1 1 100% 1
Not Contacted/
Off-Topic
(3) 24 92% (1) 16 56% 0
Total questions 10 42 52
Table 9: Support overview and success rates
section 4, interventions that fell in categories 7 and 8 were measures
of last resort, and we classified the associated tasks as failed, but
used the data separately to judge their relative difficulty. For more
on this, see section 5.1.
Table 9 shows the results of the support coding in descending
order. The participant count does not add up to 31, because partici-
pants can be listed in multiple categories depending on the type and
number of questions that they asked (excluding off-topic questions).
There were almost three times as many support requests in the
CA-Traditional condition compared to the CA-Certbot condition,
and there were nine times as many category 7 and 8 support inter-
ventions, which indicates that the usability of Certbot is superior. A
further noteworthy indicator is that 22 of 24 (92%) participants who
did not contact support managed to successfully use CA-Certbot,
and only 9 of 16 (56%) successfully configured with CA-Traditional.
In five cases, the experimenter actively supported the participants
(category 7 or 8) because otherwise they would not have been able
to complete the task. Two participants were not able to acquire a
certificate under the CA-Traditional condition, and thus, received
instructions for the installation part of the task. One participant
failed to enable Apache2’s mod_ssl plugin to enable TLS, and two
others did not manage to restart the Apache2 web server due to
an Apache configuration error. As stated before, we did not count
these participants as succeeding in that condition.
5.5 User Feedback
After being exposed to a condition, participants were asked to fill
out a survey concerning the task they had just completed. At the
end of the survey for the second task, they were additionally asked
to complete a final survey on which comparative questions were
asked.
5.5.1 CA-Certbot Survey. After completing the CA-Certbot task,
participants were asked if they had previously heard of Let’s En-
crypt, and to describe the purpose of the software in their own
words. All answers were gathered and coded by two researchers.
Fourteen (of 31) had already heard of Let’s Encrypt. We identified
that most of the answers mentioned that Let’s Encrypt is a certifi-
cate authority (19 participants) that issues free certificates (11) to
secure communication with a web server (8).
In each task survey, we asked participants which task-related
steps they considered easy and which they considered hard. Of the
31 participants who finished CA-Certbot and filled out the survey,
six mentioned that it was difficult to configure the Apache2 web
server. For example, P2 addressed the configuration of an automatic
redirect: “Adding another host to the non-SSL redirects turned out
[to be] annoying, Certbot did not completely fix the configuration
files on –expand mode. [sic]” Two participants mentioned that the
“large” amount of documentation for Let’s Encrypt was hard to
understand. However, one of them stated that it was “still very good”
(P26). Finally, participants desired more information about what
Certbot does, and wished to understand “what is happening in the
background” (P28). Concerning the easy parts of the configuration
process, many participants mentioned Certbot itself (12) followed
by the configuration (two) and the ease of the overall process due
to Certbot (two).
5.5.2 CA-Traditional Survey. Following the CA-Traditional task,
we asked the same questions. Six participants reported problems
with deploying the certificate in the Apache2 configuration, and
four had difficulties understanding the documentation. P26 com-
mented “Each step was not very easy to understand. There should
have been more details or explanations.” Concerning the tasks that
were perceived as easy, seven participants mentioned the documen-
tation because “it basically was just copy pasting” (P11) followed by
easy key generation (three).
5.5.3 Comparative Survey. In the final survey, we asked the partic-
ipants to compare the two tasks in terms of the five aspects: How
“Easy to use,” “Easy to understand,” “Time-consuming,” “Transpar-
ent,” and “Complex” were the systems?
Figure 2: Participants’ perceptions of the two tasks (n = 16,
those who succeeded in both)
Figure 2 shows the plotted outcome of this question set for par-
ticipants who completed both tasks successfully. It is based on a
7-point scale ranging from 1 (CA-Certbot was better), to 4 (theywere
the same), to 7 (CA-Traditional was better). In all categories except
“Transparent,” CA-Certbot performed better than CA-Traditional. It
seems that the level of automation that Certbot offers reduced the
perception of transparency.
6 LIMITATIONS
This study has several limitations that must be considered when
interpreting the results. The sample consisted of computer science
students from one institution. Although there is growing evidence
that computer science students are useful proxies for these kinds
of studies (Krombholz et al. [31], Yakdan et al. [48], Naiakshina et
al. [35]), the results should not be over-interpreted and we caution
against using the absolute numbers from this study to infer how a
wider administrator population would fare. In particular, the trouble
some of our participants had with file permissions is unlikely to
affect seasoned administrators. However, it is likely that there are
also varying skill levels among real administrators, and thus, we
think that the insights gathered from the mix of skill levels is useful.
We are also confident that the overall results of the A/B test are
useful despite this limitation.
This study was also limited by the laboratory setting. It is likely
that had the participants performed these tasks in a production
environment with real-world security implications, they would
have behaved differently. In a real setting, the participants could
also have have taken more time.
Finally, the two separate time limits could have introduced a
bias, which we did not think of beforehand. Although the two- and
three-hour limits were grounded in the pre-studies, we did not
consider the possible interaction between the two. It is possible that
outcomes were affected due to a difference in learning and fatigue
between the conditions. We discuss both possibilities and contrast
this setup with a study setup with a three-hour limit for each of
the two tasks.
Luckily, only two participants (P9 and P15) ran into the two-hour
time limit for the CA-Certbot task. Both startedwith the CA-Certbot
task. They also both failed the CA-Traditional task. If they had had
three hours instead of two for the CA-Certbot task, they might have
succeeded in the CA-Certbot task, and they might have learned
enough during that additional hour to then also succeed in the CA-
Traditional task. To judge the likelihood of either of these options,
we analyzed the bash and web history of both participants. Both
spent a lot of time getting familiar with the file and permission
system, as well as the Apache2 configuration files. Even though it is
possible that these two participants would have succeeded in their
tasks if they had had one hour more, we do not think it is likely. To
put this into context, participants who succeeded in the CA-Certbot
task needed a median of 18 minutes (Mean = 21, SD = 15) to finish
their tasks. Those who succeeded in the CA-Traditional task needed
a median of 65 minutes (Mean = 57, SD = 27). Thus, although the
different cut-off times were not a good design choice, they did not
seem to have a negative impact on the results.
7 RECOMMENDATIONS
7.1 Recommended Improvements for Certbot
The findings presented in section 5 clearly show that the designers
of Certbot have done an excellent job in making TLS configuration
easier and faster. Certbot outperforms the traditional approach in
almost all areas. In particular, the automation of the Apache-related
tasks proved to be beneficial to the participants. But there is still
room for improvement. The biggest negative aspect we found is
that participants consistently ranked Certbot’s transparency lower
than the manual approach, saying things like “everything was easy,
but [...] Certbot is not transparent to me. I do not know what it ac-
tually did and the whole process inside, for me it is like (a) black
box” (P21) or “which is a little worrying for security-related tasks in
my opinion” (P28). Although Certbot offers a verbose option, none
of the participants made use of it. As we saw the main benefit in
automating the Apache steps, it is an interesting avenue for future
work to explore whether additional manual steps would have a
negative or positive impact on the overall usability, security, and
perception of the system.
In addition, the use of additional security features was not ob-
vious to participants, and is not contained in the Certbots’ default
workflow: “The problem is that, with Certbot you cannot use HPKP,
OCSP Must-Staple or Expect-CT, because you don’t get a fixed private-
key, and no control over the CSR” (P17). Because Certbot is the
recommended command line tool for Let’s Encrypt, it has to cover
many use cases and different types of administrators. However,
offering users more advanced security configurations per default
could be beneficial for the overall security. But this path has to
be trodden with care. Although some experts missed advanced
settings and extended configuration possibilities, we argue that
Certbot is on the right path, because it is making security usable for
most users. Nevertheless, future work should look into the tradeoff
between security and generalizability.
A final minor observation concerns the “www” sub-domain. As
stated previously, although it is not a requirement, it is a common
convention that “www.tld.com” leads to the same location as the
plain domain “tld.com.” Currently, Certbot expects the adminis-
trator to know about this technicality and manually specify both
options. Alashwali et al.’s study [6] found, that “www” domains
tend to have a stronger security than their related plain domains. In
this study, we saw a similar pattern, as many participants failed to
include both domains. Considering the huge scale of LE and Certbot,
this can lead to an even larger number of false positive warnings
than Akhawe et al. found [5]. We recommend to prompting a dialog
to the user that offers the option to directly issue the certificate for
both domains with an explanation why this can make sense.
7.2 Lessons Learned from Certbot
Most academic papers highlight usability failures when examining
security solutions. We studied Certbot because the general per-
ception was that Certbot offered good usability. The study results
confirms this perception. The EFF’s Certbot and Let’s Encrypt offer
vastly better usability, leading to significantly higher success rates
in less time. Therefore, we want to take this opportunity to see
whether there are lessons to be learned and applied to other appli-
cation areas. In our assessment, one of the key factors of Certbot’s
success is its simplicity born through the good design decision
of a team of experts combined with good administrator-centered
engineering. Participants did not need to know much about what
was going on. Certbot applied the knowledge of its experts auto-
matically with little need for specialized knowledge, by guiding the
user through the process using a dialog-like approach instead of
requiring multiple commands on the command line. Looking back,
it is interesting to note for how long HTTPS configuration was
considered a hard problem to solve at scale. Although the concept
that a small group of experts decides what is best for the community
is not without risk, from a usability perspective it offers a lot of
potential.
The two main components of the good usability stem from au-
tomation and safe defaults. Certbot automated seven steps while
introducing only two new manual steps (see Figure 4). Certbot
also uses safe defaults for most security properties. The only bigger
disadvantage of Certbot was that participants felt that it lacked
transparency.
The question is whether Certbot’ success can be replicated in
other areas. For this, we need to look at several properties of the
HTTPS scenario. First, we discovered that it was mainly the automa-
tion of the Apache steps that reduced failures. Although automating
the other steps saved time and improved overall usability, what
would classically be seen as the difficult steps, i.e., where the admin
has to interact with cryptographic concepts, such as key generation
and signing, actually did not lead to failures. As we discuss below
this suggests that a good portion of research in the field of usable
security and privacy might have focused on the less important
parts. Second, the other implication from the fact that the Apache
automation is that Certbot profits from the fact that it needs to
support only a limited number of web servers. Third, there are
clear recommendations about what are considered safe defaults,
e.g., what key size is sufficient, what ciphers and protocol versions
should be used, etc.
The attributes listed above do not lend themselves to all areas.
Thus we present both scenarios in which we believe the Certbot
approach can work, as well as some where other concepts need to
be found.
7.2.1 eMail/Messaging. Secure email is one of the bogeymen of
computer security that has been plaguing usable security researchers
in the end-user realm for decades [22,40,47]. Although standards
like PGP 9 and S/MIME 10 have been around for a long time, adop-
tion is minimal. Potentially, one of the problems is that usable
security researchers have mainly targeted end-users, and not de-
velopers and administrators. Offering a simple Let’s Encrypt-like
service which allows administrators of an organization to roll out
free and easy-to-use certificates to users, and take the burden of
publishing and finding keys from them, might turn out to be a miss-
ing link. This scenario, of course, is a much more challenging than
the one Let’s Encrypt currently addresses. The heterogeneous envi-
ronment and the large number of different components involved
increase the difficulty.
Whatsapp11, for example, hides the whole key exchange pro-
cess from its users while enabling full end-to-end-encryption. Like
other centralized messaging services, the engineering needed to
do this is far less than in the heterogeneous email environment.
However, the high adoption rate shows the promise of automating
key management for end-user messaging. Thus, taking a Certbot
approach to email encryption could be worthwhile, and we would
like to see the usable security community look at the administrator
and developer side of this old problem.
9https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3156, Accessed: 09/02/2019
10https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1847, Accessed: 09/02/2019
11https://www.whatsapp.com/security/WhatsApp-Security-Whitepaper.pdf,
Accessed: 09/02/2019
Password Storage. Research by Naiakshina et al. [35,36] showed
that students and software development freelancers have many
difficulties when trying to store passwords securely. We see several
parallels to the TLS configuration scenario. In both cases, a small
number of cryptographic steps need to be taken. From the point of
view of security experts, these steps are fairly easy and as HTTPS,
recommended safe choices are available. But many participants did
not know all steps (salting, hashing and iterations), or were not
up to date. For instance, many thought that MD5 was still accept-
able, or used Base64 encoding to store the passwords “securely”.
Although many libraries offer secure storage, there is no highly
visible authority and no generic approach. An initiative with a tool
that can generate secure password storage code by providing a
standardized and secure method by default in a number of different
languages could offer similar improvements as Certbot. However,
the challenge is that the number of different languages is large,
and environments are more heterogeneous, which increases the
technical complexity of the tool.
7.2.2 Firewall Configuration. An area of usable security research
where the Certbot approach is less likely to work as well is enter-
prise firewall configuration. The task itself is mostly procedural;
however, important security decisions specific to the administra-
tors’ goals have to be made, which was identified as a challenging
area for usable security research by Edwards et al. [17]. Admin-
istrators are often confronted with difficult decisions concerning
edge cases about which packets should be discarded. Those config-
urations are bound to functional consequences, and giving a “one
fits all” solution is hard. The functional steps, i.e. the configuration,
can be supported with good usability [46]. However, the decisions
that operators have to make cannot be easily automated, and other
forms of usability research are needed.
7.2.3 Update Management. Similar to the task of firewall configu-
ration is the case of update management for administrators who
manage heterogeneous environments. Each different platform and
software increases the complexity of the task and hinders simple
automation. The process involves multiple stakeholders, and the de-
cisions have consequences that impact the security and availability
of systems. Previous work showed that automatic updates are not
“universally suitable” for a corporate context [33]. The update pro-
cess spans multiple stages, different policies and things to consider,
such as disruptions in the others’ workflow. While updates have
dependencies on other parts, additional usable security research is
needed.
8 LESSONS LEARNED CONCERNING
ADMINISTRATOR STUDY DESIGN
We studied a complex administrative task in the lab to conduct an
A/B comparison of Certbot and a traditional CA. As usable security
research into administrators and developers is still a young field
with little methodological experience, we would like to discuss
insights gained from this extensive five-hour lab study.
8.1 Interaction via Support Channel
Allowing interaction between the experimenter and participants
brings several risks. First, there is the risk that the experimenter
fails to treat all participants equally. This can be countered to a cer-
tain extent by using a playbook (see Appendix D) that defines what
actions an experimenter is allowed to take, and has ready-to-use
texts. Second, even if the experimenter is consistent, they might
still influence the results by the playbook favoring one condition
or another. A careful and neutral design is needed to avoid this
risk. Finally, the use of a support channel can influence the time
participants need for a task and make the evaluation more complex,
because the number of result categories is higher (succeeded without
help, succeeded with help, failed without help, and failed with help).
Despite these risks, we found the support channel offered very valu-
able insights into the study subject and very natural interaction.
For instance, an insight we would have lost had it not been for
the support channel was that one participant failed to perform the
domain configuration of Apache but succeeded in using Certbot.
The participant also failed to configure the traditional CA. Without
the support channel, it would have looked like the participant had
failed at both approaches. However, with the interaction, we saw
that Certbot’s usability is so good that even someone who strug-
gles with simple configuration tasks can use it. We also gathered
interesting comments and feedback from the chat. On the whole,
we think the benefits outweigh the drawbacks.
8.2 Framing
We used two different study descriptions. One was a very simple
description that made no attempt at realism or hiding the fact that
it was a study task. The second introduced a role-playing scenario
in an attempt to be more realistic. It used custom domains, websites,
and user credentials to facilitate the role-playing scenario. We did
not see any difference in behavior based on these two different
frames, and thus, the substantial extra effort needed to create a more
realistic study setting when designing studies for administrators in
the lab context does not seem necessary. However, the lab study
setup itself could have framed the participants in such a way that
the scenario description did not have an influence on the outcome
and that other mechanisms, e.g., field studies where the participants
deploy a certificate for their own site, have to be researched. We
found indicators that nudging people to security results in better
security outcomes. More work is needed to analyze the influence
of these factors.
8.3 Measuring Performance
The duration and degrees of freedom from the participants’ per-
spective have an impact on the broad range of possible outcomes.
In this study design, the participants had the possibility of choosing
a non-linear way of solving the task. We used a time-consuming
approach and manually tracked all user actions by watching the
recorded sessions. But even then it was not easy to decide when
a certain task was stopped, another one started, or a previous one
was resumed. It also was hard to tell if a participant was taking
a break. Requesting participants to log this would have led to an
increased mental load for them, and thus, reduced the focus and
created a more artificial situation. Automated approaches for this
kind of task tracking would be extremely useful.
8.4 Expertise and Study Design
As mentioned in section 4.3, unlike Krombholz et al., we invited
all students who completed the pre-screening survey to participate
in the lab study, independent of their pre-screening score. The ra-
tionale for excluding low-scoring participants is to conserve study
resources. There is little value in having a participant who lacks
basic skills take part in an administrator study. Although it is less
critical for a within-subjects design, unfit participants could seri-
ously skew between-subjects studies. However, taking only the best
participants, as in the Krombholz et al. study, skews the results as
well. It would be ideal to have a pre-screening survey with which
to filter participants who lack the basic skills without also losing
low-skilled participants. Unfortunately, our showed that most of the
screening questions were not good predictors of participants’ per-
formance. In this study only the number of previously configured
servers seemed like a promising predictor.
We saw a similar picture in a developer study conducted by
Wermke et al., who found a correlation between years of program-
ming experience and success in the tasks [1]. However, a similar
study by Naiakshina et al. [36] failed to find the same correlation.
Thus, although expertise is undoubtedly important for the out-
come of expert studies, assessing expertise is very hard. The difficult
pre-screening process makes between-subjects study designs par-
ticularly risky, and we recommend using within-subjects designs
whenever possible. At the same time, we encourage more work
on assessing skill levels using questionnaires, to enable reliable
balancing in future work.
9 CONCLUSION
We conducted a randomized control trial to compare the usability
of two different approaches of configuring HTTPS for an Apache
web server. We compared the EFF’s Certbot, the recommended com-
mand line tool for Let’s Encrypt CA, with a traditional approach
that uses Let’s Encrypt in the back-end. We showed that the EFF’s
Certbot is significantly easier and faster to use for all participants’
skill levels. As a consequence of such improved usability aspects,
significantly more users were able to set up a secure HTTPS config-
uration using LE than using the traditional approach. We identified
that automation of steps pertaining to the configuration of Apache
drove the increased success rate. Key generation, signing, and other
cryptographic and CA-related steps did not cause the problems that
might have been assumed.
Despite excellent results for Certbot, we made some minor rec-
ommendations that we hope will further improve the usability and
security of LE and Certbot, and we discussed where lessons can be
learned form the Certbot approach. We suggest that future work
should focus on the improvement of the transparency perception of
Certbot. Finally, we discussed lessons learned from conducting an
administrator study and made recommendations for future studies.
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A SURVEY AFTER BOTH TASKS
These are the questions we asked our participants after they fin-
ished each task. On a 7-point Likert scale they should rate the task
difficulty as well as the TLS-deployment, the certificate acquisition
and the web server configuration.
• Please enter your Study ID:
• Had you heard of Let’s Encrypt before the study? (only CA-
Certbot task)
• Please describe the purpose of "Let’s Encrypt" in your own
words: (only CA-Certbot task)
• Overall, the task was ...? (Likert)
• Which aspects were particularly difficult / easy?
• Please tell us your opinion of this task regarding the follow-
ing aspects: Easy to use, Easy to understand, Time consum-
ing, Transparent, Complicated
• Did you successfully complete the TLS configuration task?
(Yes, No, Not sure)
• If you didnâĂŹt finish the TLS configuration task, which
steps are still missing to secure the communication?
• Overall, the process of TLS deployment was... (Likert)
• Overall, the process of acquiring a Certificate from a CA
was... (Likert)
• Which aspects were particularly difficult?
• Which aspects were particularly easy?
• Overall, the process of configuring the web server to enable
HTTPS was... (Likert)
• Which aspects were particularly difficult?
• Which aspects were particularly easy?
B FINAL SURVEY
In the final survey we asked the participants about their security
background and their experience as an administrator and howmany
web servers they have administered. In addition we asked them
to compare the both tasks with respect to the aspects ”Easy to
use”, ”Easy to understand”, ”Time consuming”,”Transparent” and
”Complexity”
• Please enter your Study ID:
• I have a good understanding of security concepts. (Likert:
strongly disagree to strongly agree)
• How often do you ask for help when faced with security
problems? (Likert: never to every time)
• How often are you asked for help when somebody is facing
security problems? (Likert: never to every time)
• How often have you added security features to projects you
were involved in? (Likert: never to every time)
• Are you currently in charge of a web server? (company,
private, non-profit association,no)
• Have you ever installed and configured a web server before?
• Have you ever installed and configured SSL/TLS before?
• Have you ever worked as a system administrator?
– What web servers have you set up before? (e.g. * Apache,
nginx,...)
– How many web servers have you set up before? (0,1,2-5,6-
15,> 15)
• Please compare both tasks regarding the following aspects
(Likert from “1 - Task 1 was better” over “4 - they were
the same” to “7 - Task 2 was better”): Easy to use, Easy to
understand, Time consuming, Transparent, Complicated
• In which tasks did you enabled HSTS (HTTP Strict Transport
* Security)? (Only in Task 1, Only in Task 2, In both, In none,
Not sure)
• Please explain your answer (Why did you enabled it? Why
not? Why don’t you know?).
• In which tasks have you enabled HPKP (HTTP Public Key
Pinning)? (Only in Task 1, Only in Task 2, In both, In none,
Not sure)
• Please explain your answer (Why did you enabled it? Why
not? Why don’t you know?).
• In which tasks have you enabled OCSP-Stapling? (Only in
Task 1, Only in Task 2, In both, In none, Not sure)
• Please explain your answer (Why did you enabled it? Why
not? Why don’t you know?).
• Did you use Mattermost for asking questions?
• If you used Mattermost to ask questions. What was your
experience of the process?
– Do you think that you would have achieved the same
result if you had not been able to chat with the support
team via Mattermost? (yes, no)
– Please explain your answer.
• Thank you for answering the questions! If you have any
comments or suggestions, please leave them here:
C PRE-SCREENING QUESTIONS
This document contains the questionswe asked in our pre-screening
to recruit the participants. Beside some demographic information
we asked them to answer bash- and web server-related questions
out of which we calculated a score for each correct answer given.
• Please enter your name:
• Please enter your e-mail address, so we can contact you for
our study:
• Please enter your age:
• Please enter your gender:
• Which university are you at?
• In which programme are you currently enrolled? (Bachelor
of CS, Master of CS, other)
• Your semester:
• How familiar are you in using the bash-shell? (Likert: “Not
familiar at all” to “Very familiar”
• Have you ever configured a web server? (yes,no)
• Howmany years of experience do you have in programming?
• How many years of experience do you have in system ad-
ministration?
• Which command is used to find out the currently used IPs?
(ifconfig, netstat, ipconfig, iptables,I don’t know)
• A symlink is created with which command? (ls -s TARGET
LINK NAME, symlink TARGET LINK NAME, ln -s TARGET
LINK NAME, ln TARGET LINK NAME )
• TLS uses ... (symmetric cryptography, asymmetric cryptog-
raphy, pem/der certificate, X.509)
• Which commands restarts the webserver? (sudo service
apache2 restart, sudo /etc/init.d/apache2 restart, sudo service
webserver restart, sudo service IIS restart)
• Where are HTML files served by the Apache-Webserver
located after default installation? (/usr/share/nginx/www,
/etc/www, /var/www, /home/www)
• Which is the best file permission for your private keys on a
Linux system? (0777, 0300, 0644, 0600)
• Please rate the security of the following Hash-functions
(Likert: ”1 - not secure” to ”7 - very secure”): Argon, MD5,
BCrypt, SHA-1, RC4
• Please describe the purpose of HSTS:
• Certificate Transparency is ... (providing access to the cer-
tificates bytecode, a standard for auditing SSL certificates,
checking if a server has enabled HTTPS, a framework that
helps maintaining the integrity of the SSL certificate system)
D ABBREVIATED MATTERMOST SUPPORT
PLAYBOOK
• AmI forced to use rsa keys? I could use ecdsa if I’mnot
bound to make use of [Own-CA-domain], as this site
only permits rsa-keys. I would request the certificate
directly from LE, if you permit.
Please use the rsa keys and the Own-CA in this case.
• In the survey, under “Study ID” shall I enter my ID,
that is printed on the paper (in my case XXX), or my
normal student ID?
Please enter [Study-Id].
• I completed the task, the portal is available, should I
configure the apache in a special way or is the usage
of the default configuration acceptable?
Since there are no other websites running I think, if it’s
accessible for everyone it is fine!
• Must I request a new certificate?
Yes, please do so.
• I’m having a problem connecting to the server i get:
Permission denied (publickey). Is it part of the task to
resolve this issue?
Please use this command: ‘ssh -i ”/sshkey.pem”
ubuntu@DOMAINNAME.com‘
• I’m stuck at hosting the files. I’m trying to create a vir-
tual host to host it
(1) Can you tell me, what have you done until now?
(2) Have you created a configuration file for apache2 in
/etc/apache2/sites-available?
(3) Have you enabled the config file with a2ensite?
(4) Have you reloaded apache2?
(5) Could you please send me the contents of the .conf file?
• Is the server running or do we need to set it up?
This is installed on the machines you connect to with ssh.
• Cannot press the ’tilde’ symbol on keyboard.
Please try ALT-Gr in combination with the "plus"-key
• Is it okay to usemy email address for the use of certbot
Please read the instructions again carefully.
• Now I am having trouble with directory as there is no
such directory: home/ubuntu/website
Please try adding a slash in front of home:
/home/ubuntu/website
• How long should one wait for the result of “openssl
dhparam -out dhparam.pem4096”?With bad luck, this
can take hours.
Our experience with this command has shown that this com-
mand is executed within few minutes (< 5).
• I am trying to install apache using sudo apt-get install
apache2 but it won’t work.
Please configure the apache2 instance on the server. You
donâĂŹt need to install on your client.
• Is the IP for apache in browser abc.def.ghi.jkl?
The IP for the server is [IP-Adress]
• I cannot copy from home/ubuntu/website/index.html
to /var/www/html
Please try putting sudo in front of the command.
• First I have to configure my server for url
http://www.sme-company-7.com then I need to useCer-
tificate of authority or can it be done other way?
This is up to you. It should work both ways.
• I am trying to run ./letsencrypt-auto –apache -d
www.sme-company-1.com but it is giving error
please try these commands: “export LC_ALL="en_US.UTF-
8” and “export LC_CTYPE="en_US.UTF-8” and then run it
again.
• Should I use blinded@blinded.com as account email
and should I generate a new key?or is a key existent
Please use the pre-entered address and create a new key.
E STUDYDESCRIPTION: REALISTIC
SCENARIO WITH CA-CERTBOT
These are the scenario letters we handed out to participants that
were in the Framing Role-Play-group and had to obtain a certifi-
cate with CA-Certbot. Page 1 contains a scenario description with
additional information about the task like the command to connect
to the AWS-server they had to configure. On the last page we pre-
sented them the four tasks they had to do. For each participant we
modified the “URL”, as well as the company name for his scenario.
We blinded the descriptions for double blind review.
F STUDYDESCRIPTION: STUDY SCENARIO
WITH CA-TRADITIONAL
This is the scenario for the Framing Study and CA-Traditional group.
The structure is very similar to the realistic one except that the task
is described without the company scenario.
